Abstract-In this paper, we investigate a novel real-time pricing scheme, which considers both renewable energy resources and traditional power resources and could effectively guide the participants to achieve individual welfare maximization in the system. To be specific, we develop a Lagrangian-based approach to transform the global optimization conducted by the power company into distributed optimization problems to obtain explicit energy consumption, supply, and price decisions for individual participants. Also, we show that these distributed problems derived from the global optimization by the power company are consistent with individual welfare maximization problems for end-users and traditional power plants. We also investigate and formalize the vulnerabilities of the real-time pricing scheme by considering two types of data integrity attacks: Ex-ante attacks and Ex-post attacks, which are launched by the adversary before or after the decision-making process. We systematically analyze the welfare impacts of these attacks on the real-time pricing scheme. Through a combination of theoretical analysis and performance evaluation, our data shows that the real-time pricing scheme could effectively guide the participants to achieve welfare maximization, while cyber-attacks could significantly disrupt the results of real-time pricing decisions, imposing welfare reduction on the participants.
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INTRODUCTION
A S one of the most important services in the energybased cyber-physical system that is a typical largescale distributed system, demand-side management (DSM) has been developed to reduce peak energy consumption, balance power demand and supply, improve energy efficiency, and reduce emissions of CO2 [1] . DSM strategies (load shifting and control, real-time pricing, day-ahead pricing, time-of-use pricing, critical-peak pricing, etc.) can improve the reliability and efficiency of the system by dynamically changing and shifting energy consumption, power supply, and electricity prices [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] . In this study, we focus on real-time pricing, which plays an important role in DSM. With the support of real-time pricing, electricity prices offered by supply-users and the traditional power plant can change in real time to reflect the variations of generation and demand conditions in each time duration [7] , [8] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] .
The existing research in real-time pricing can be divided into four main categories [7] , [8] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] . The first category is concerned with reducing the peak-to-average load ratio (e.g., [7] , [14] , [16] , [18] , [19] ), while the second focuses on minimizing economic cost (e.g., [8] , [15] , [17] , [20] , [21] ). The third is concerned with maximizing the welfare of all participants, considering both economic cost and users' comfort (e.g., [13] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] ). The fourth is concerned with improving the cost efficiency, which is defined as the ratio of consumer's total consumption benefit to total electricity payment within a time duration (e.g., [26] , [27] ). Notice that the majority of existing research efforts on the third category have considered only a single type of energy resource (either renewable or traditional power resources).
Real-time pricing relies on smart meters to make decisions on energy consumption, energy supply, and electricity prices. Once the adversary launches data integrity attacks, one representative type of cyber attacks against smart meters, and manipulates parameters related to decisionmaking processes, erroneous decisions will be made and the welfare of participants in the system will be reduced. There have been a number of research efforts on data integrity attacks in the energy-based cyber-physical system [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] , [35] , [36] , [37] , [38] , [39] , [40] , [41] , [42] , [43] , [44] , [45] , [46] , [47] , [48] , [49] , [50] , [51] , [52] . For example, data integrity attacks on state estimation [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] , [32] , [33] , real-time LMP (Locational Marginal Prices) [34] , [35] , [37] , [38] , [39] , [40] , [41] and the multistep electricity price model [36] , [49] have been studied. For the real-time pricing, Mohsenian-Rad et al. [42] conceptually investigated that an adversary could compromise the communication process, smart meters, or data centers to compromise a variety of practical loads and the price signal via Internet-based load-altering attacks (a typical type of data integrity attacks). Research efforts in [43] , [44] , [45] , [46] , [47] , [48] , [51] analyzed the impact of data integrity attacks on the stability of power grids, in which the adversary could inject false price signals or load data into the real-time pricing process. In contrast, few studies have been devoted to analyzing and formalizing the impact of data integrity attacks, against the real-time pricing, on the welfare of participants in energy-based cyber-physical systems.
To address these issues, we make three contributions in this paper as follows:
First, we investigate a real-time pricing scheme that considers both a variety of distributed renewable energy resources and traditional power resources with an objective of maximizing the benefit (or welfare) of all participants in the system. By selecting appropriate multi-parameter utility functions, renewable cost functions, and traditional cost functions, we formalize the welfare maximization problem associated with various participants, including demandusers, supply-users, traditional power plants, and power companies. We use the Lagrangian-based method in [13] to transform the global optimization conducted by the power company to distributed optimization problems to obtain explicit energy consumption, supply, and price decisions for individual participants. We also demonstrate that these distributed problems derived from the global optimization by the power company are consistent with individual welfare maximization problems associated with end-users and traditional power plants.
Second, to address the issue of cyber-attacks against the real-time pricing scheme, we consider two typical data integrity attacks: Ex-ante attacks and Ex-post attacks. Ex-ante attacks, launched by the adversary before the decision-making process, could inject false data into demand-users or inject false data into supply-users. Expost attacks, launched by the adversary after the decision-making process, could inject false data into demandusers and supply-users, or inject false data into demandusers and traditional power plants. We systematically formalize and analyze the welfare impacts of these attacks on the real-time pricing scheme. The metrics include welfare loss and welfare gain. Our analysis shows that those attacks can significantly disrupt the effectiveness of the real-time pricing scheme, posing a welfare reduction for both end-users and traditional power plants. Our research is helpful in understanding the risk of these attacks and designing effective mitigation schemes to address these vulnerabilities.
Third, to evaluate the efficiency of the real-time pricing scheme and validate the welfare impact of the proposed data integrity attacks on the real-time pricing scheme, we conduct a performance evaluation. In comparison with existing schemes, by performing average cost analysis, our data shows that the real-time pricing scheme is more efficient and is acceptable to all participants. Our developed scheme can effectively guide end-users and the traditional power plant to consume or provide energy efficiently according to real-time status, leading to the welfare maximization for individual entities. Our experimental data also indicates that the investigated attacks can significantly disrupt the real-time pricing decisions, leading to a welfare reduction for both end-users and the traditional power plant.
Our focus is on developing a pricing scheme and analyzing its vulnerabilities through the collected information from distributed individual participants in the energy-based cyber-physical system, which is a typical large-scale distributed system. This paper is an extension of our previous work in [53] . The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present network and threat model. In Section 3, we present our real-time pricing scheme. In Section 4, we investigate the impacts of data integrity attacks on the real-time pricing scheme. In Section 5, we show experimental results to validate the efficiency of the real-time pricing scheme and the impacts of proposed data integrity attacks on real-time pricing. In Section 6, we discuss some extensions. In Section 7, we review existing literature. We conclude the paper in Section 8.
NETWORK AND THREAT MODEL
The energy-based cyber-physical system consists of three types of participants: end-users, traditional power plants, and the power company. An end-user is denoted as a supply-user if the amount of the energy that the user can generate is not less than the amount of energy consumed by the user; otherwise, the user is denoted as a demand-user. A traditional power plant can provide power supply from a central location. In addition to demand-users, supply-users, and the traditional power plant, the power company is another important participant in the system, which manages the power generation, transmission, and distribution, as well as the electricity market. To predict or measure the amount of power consumed and generated, smart meters (denoted as SM) can be deployed by end-users and the traditional power plant. Energy consumption controllers (ECCs) embedded in smart meters can control energy consumption, energy supply, and electricity prices for associated participants, including demand-users, supply-users, and the traditional power plant. Fig. 1 illustrates an example of the system, showing all participants. Here, A, B, and C represent supply-users, D, E, and F denote demand-users, G is a traditional power plant, and H is a power company.
In the energy-based cyber-physical system, participants interconnect with each other through smart meters using Internet or two-way wireless communication. As smart meters are often deployed in open environments, it is feasible for an adversary to launch cyber attacks to compromise them [29] . Then, the adversary can inject false parameters (e.g., preference factors for renewable energy consumption) related to the decision-making process in the system via exante attacks, leading to erroneous decisions for energy consumption, energy supply, and electricity prices. Also, cyber attacks can compromise the obtained decisions for energy consumption and energy supply, subverting the correct decisions with erroneously greater or smaller values in expost attacks. These attacks could reduce the welfare of both end-users (demand-users and supply-users) and the traditional power plant. All notations used in this paper are defined in Table 1 . Notice that all parameters are the simplified and common form and can represent parameters of all time durations. For example, w i1 represents preference factors to renewable energy for demand-user i in all time durations. All values of compromised amount (e.g., Dw k1 ) in this paper are also larger or equal to 0.
REAL-TIME PRICING SCHEME
In this section, we present our real-time pricing scheme. First, we establish welfare maximization models for all participants. Second, we conduct the theoretical analysis and present the detailed real-time pricing process.
The objective of the real-time pricing scheme is to maximize social welfare of all the participants through maximizing the overall (global) welfare, which we define as the difference between the summation of subjective satisfaction of all demand-users and the summation of generation cost of all supply-users and the traditional power plant. This is because the payment for power consumption from all demand-users is equal to the profit from supply-users and the traditional power plant. Similar to existing studies in [13] , [14] , [16] , [25] , we assume that the decision making in different time durations is independent in this paper. Thus, the decision making in a time duration only depends on the energy consumption constraints of the corresponding time duration. Notice that this real-time pricing problem can be solved either at the operation center of the power company, or at the individual participants. In this study, we focus on implementing a solution at the power company. Specifically, the power company collects the distributed information from individual participants and makes decisions for energy consumption, supply, and price. These decisions are then transmitted to the individual participants, guiding them to consume or provide energy according to these decisions.
Problem Formulation
The Individual Welfare Maximization of Demand-Users
The objective of demand-users is to consume more power at a lower price while obtaining subjective satisfaction. Thus, the welfare of demand-users is the difference between this subjective satisfaction and the payment for power consumption. From the aspect of microeconomics [54] , we leverage the concept of a utility function to denote the level of subjective satisfaction for each demand-user. Based on [47] , [55] , [56] , [57] , [58] , we use the utility function for each demanduser as
where d gi is the renewable energy consumption for demand-user i, d ti is the traditional power consumption for demand-user i, w i1 and w i2 are preference factors for renewable energy consumption and traditional power consumption, respectively, for demand-user i. Here, w i1 and w i2 are obtained in advance based on real-time conditions, which can influence the amount of available energy resources. As renewable energy resources are time-dependent and uncertain in amount, demand-users may have different preferences to renewable energy resources and traditional power resources in different time durations. In general, users' preferences are larger when the amount of available energy resources is bigger. For example, preferences to renewable energy resources may increase with the increase of sunlight intensity (i.e., the amount of available renewable energy resources), which varies in different time durations. The traditional power supply decision for traditional power plants.
Compromised amount of the traditional power supply decision for traditional power plants.
The traditional power supply decision for traditional power plants when the data integrity attack is launched.
Welfare loss or gain for demand-user k or supply-user k.
DW :
Welfare loss or gain for traditional power plants.
The utility function must satisfy the following conditions [54] : (i) because demand-users prefer more energy when energy consumption does not exceed the maximum energy they desire to consume, the first-order partial derivative of the utility function is positive; (ii) with the increase of energy consumption, as the desire of demand-users to consume energy gradually reaches saturation, the second-order partial derivative is negative. Theorem 1. The selected utility function also implicitly accounts for income levels of demand-users [54] . In other words, the payment for power consumption should not exceed the income of demand-users.
Proof. We can derive the following equations from the utility function of demand-users:
Then, we obtain
which satisfies the consumer equilibrium condition that considers the income of consumers in microeconomics [54] .
t u
With the selected utility function, the welfare function for demand-users is
(3) where p 1 and p 2 are the prices of the renewable energy and the traditional power, respectively.
Hence, the individual welfare maximization problem for demand-users can be formalized as
in which d gi and d ti are the variables to be optimized and represent the renewable energy and traditional power consumption for demand-user i. Other notations have been defined in previous equations.
The Individual Welfare Maximization of Supply-Users
The goal of supply-users is to provide more power at a higher price for a higher economic profit. To this end, the welfare of supply-users is defined as the difference between the profit that they obtain and the cost for generating renewable energy. We use the following increasing and convex quadratic function [59] to model the generation cost for renewable energy resources, which considers operation, installation and maintenance cost:
where p gj is the amount of renewable energy resources provided by supply-user j, a j , b j , and c j are coefficients of the cost function of the supply-user j. This cost consists of two parts apart from the constant term. The first one is the operation cost of pulling energy from the storage of generator and the second one is the amortized installation and maintenance cost of the renewable energy generator.
With the selected generation cost function, the welfare function of supply-users is
where p 1 is the price of the renewable energy supply. Hence, the individual welfare maximization problem for supply-users can be formalized as
in which p gj are the variables to be optimized and represent the renewable energy supply for supply-user j.
The Individual Welfare Maximization of the Traditional Power Plant
The goal of the traditional power plant is to provide more power at a higher price for a higher economic profit. To this end, the welfare of the traditional power plant is defined as the difference between the profit that it obtains and the cost for generating traditional power. We use the following increasing and convex quadratic function [13] , [60] to compute traditional power generation cost, which represents the generation cost of generators:
where p t is the amount of traditional power resources provided by the traditional power plant, m, n, and q are coefficients of the cost function of the traditional power plant. Based on the selected generation cost function, the welfare function of the traditional power plant is,
where p 2 is the price of the traditional power supply. Hence, the individual welfare maximization problem for the traditional power plant can be formalized as
in which p t is the variable to be optimized and represents the traditional power supply for the traditional power plant.
The Global Welfare Maximization of the Power Company
As stated above, the objectives of the power-supply side and the power-demand side are in conflict. The power company needs to develop an effective real-time pricing scheme to resolve such contradictions and pursues a global maximum welfare to achieve social fairness, which is the difference amongst the welfare of all participants. To achieve the supply-demand balance, the power company shall ensure that the total amount of renewable energy supply is not less than the total amount of renewable energy consumption. The power company should also ensure that the total amount of traditional power consumption is not more than the total amount of traditional power supply. Thus, the global welfare maximization problem conducted by the power company can be formalized by
where d gi and d ti are the renewable energy and traditional power consumption for demand-user i, w i1 and w i2 are preference factors for renewable energy and traditional power consumption for demand-user i, and p gj and p t are the amount of renewable energy and traditional power resources provided by supply-user j and the traditional power plant. Among these variables, d gi , d ti , p gj and p t are the ones to be optimized.
Analysis of the Optimization Problem
Based on the individual welfare maximization models discussed above, we now perform an analysis to show explicit energy consumption, supply, and price decisions for individual participants and show the consistency of global welfare maximization performed by the power company and individual welfare maximization performed by end-users and the traditional power plant. Specifically, we use the Lagrangian approach to derive the objective function DOF of the dual problem D as
where 1 and 2 are Lagrangian multipliers, and the dual problem D is min DOF f g. From Equation (12), the optimal renewable energy consumption and traditional power consumption for demandusers can be obtained by solving
and the optimal renewable energy consumption and traditional power consumption are
Thus, the decisions for demand-users in terms of the optimal renewable energy consumption and traditional power consumption are
where
are maximum values of renewable energy consumption and the traditional power consumption of demand-user i.
From Equation (12), the optimal renewable energy supply for supply-users can be obtained by solving
Then, the optimal renewable energy supply is
Thus, the decisions for supply-users for the optimal renewable energy supply are
where p max gj is the maximum value of renewable energy supply of supply-user j.
From Equation (12), the optimal traditional power supply for the traditional power plant can be obtained by solving
and the optimal traditional power supply is
Thus, the decision for the traditional power plant for the optimal traditional power supply is
where p t max is the maximum value of traditional power supply of the traditional power plant.
With the optimal renewable energy consumption, traditional power consumption, renewable energy supply, and traditional power supply, the dual problem D can be recast into
in which 1 and 2 are the variables to be optimized and represent prices of renewable energy and traditional power, and the other variables have been defined in Equations (1), (5), and (8).
Theorem 2. From Equation (22), the values of 1 and 2 are
Proof. From Equation (22), we can obtain
and
Thus, we have
Because A Á C À B 2 > 0; A > 0, Equation (22) can be used to obtain a minimum value and we can obtain 1 and 2 when the first-order partial derivative of 1 and 2 are both zero as
Thus, we show explicit energy consumption, supply, and price decisions for individual participants. Obviously, if p 1 ¼ 1 ; p 2 ¼ 2 , distributed optimization problems in Equations (13), (16) , and (19) of the power company are the same as the individual welfare maximization problems of endusers and the traditional power plant in Equations (4), (7), and (10). Thus, the global optimization problem for the power company is consistent with the individual welfare maximization problems for end-users and the traditional power plant.
Real-Time Pricing Process
From the analysis above, the basic workflow for conducting real-time pricing is described as follows:
Step 1: At the beginning of a new time duration t n ðn ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T max Þ, smart meters deployed to end-users measure the amount of energy generation and the energy consumption of user i, denoted as g i and c i .
Step 2: From the meter measurements obtained through Step 1, smart meters compute the difference of the energy generation and the energy consumption as sum i ¼ g i À c i . Then, smart meters can determine whether a user is a supply-user, if sum i ! 0; or a demand-user, otherwise.
Step 3: If a user is determined as a demand-user, the ECC embedded in the associated smart meter determines the maximum values of renewable energy consumption (i.e., are both equal to the total amount of energy consumption of household appliances when all household appliances are on.
Step 4: If a user is determined to be a supply-user, the ECC embedded in the associated smart meter determines the maximum value of renewable energy supply (i.e., p gj ) as p max gj , where p max gj represents the maximum generating capacity of user j in this time duration.
Step 5: The ECC embedded in the smart meter of the traditional power plant determines the maximum value of the traditional power supply (i.e., p t ) as p t max , where p t max represents the maximum generating capacity of the traditional power plant in this time duration.
Step 6: The power company collects the distributed information from individual participants (i.e., preference factors and maximum values of energy consumption from demand-users and coefficients of the cost function and maximum generating capacity from supply-users and the traditional power plant) and makes decisions including: (a) the renewable energy consumption and traditional power consumption for demand-users denoted as f d gi , f d ti , respectively, based on Equation (15); (b) the energy supply for supplyusers as f p gj based on Equation (18); (c) the energy supply for the traditional power plant as e p t based on Equation (21); (d) electricity prices of renewable energy and traditional power as 1 and 2 , based on Equations (26) and (27) . Then, these decisions are transmitted to demand-users, supplyusers, and the traditional power plant.
Step 7: Demand-users, supply-users, and the traditional power plant consume or provide energy based on the decisions made in Step 6: (a) demand-user i consumes renewable energy and traditional power according to f d gi and f d ti ; (b) supply-user j and the traditional power plant provide renewable energy and traditional power according to f p gj and e p t ; (c) renewable energy and traditional power are traded at the prices 1 and 2 .
DATA INTEGRITY ATTACKS AGAINST REAL-TIME PRICING SCHEMES
We now analyze the impacts of one representative cyber attack, which is called data integrity attack on the performance of real-time pricing. Here, we consider two types of data integrity attacks: Ex-ante attacks and Ex-post attacks. Ex-ante attacks are launched by the adversary before the decision-making process, while Ex-post attacks are launched by the adversary after the decision-making process. The real-time pricing processes either in the normal case or in the attacked case can be formalized as optimization problems based on the Lagrangian approach. Nonetheless, optimization problems in the normal case and in the attacked case are different. First, decisions obtained in the normal case are derived from normal parameters. Second, decisions obtained in the Ex-ante attacked case are derived from falsified parameters, which are injected by data integrity attacks before the decision-making process. Third, decisions obtained in the Ex-post attacked case are derived from normal parameters, while these obtained decisions are modified to be either erroneously larger or smaller values after the decision-making process (i.e., the manipulated values are injected by the data integrity attacks after the decision-making process). The evaluation metrics include welfare loss and welfare gain, which are defined as the absolute value of the difference or the difference in welfare when the data integrity attack exists and does not exist. Objectives of adversaries to disrupt the real-time pricing include: (i) launching data integrity attacks to cause the welfare loss of other participants, and (ii) launching data integrity attacks to obtain welfare gain and cause welfare loss of other participants.
Ex-Ante Attacks
Definition 1. Ex-ante attack is launched by the adversary before the decision-making process. In this case, the adversary can inject false parameters related to the decision-making process in the system, leading to incorrect decisions for energy consumption, energy supply, and electricity prices.
We outline a framework for exploring the ex-ante data integrity attack space in Fig. 2 . The x-axis represents the compromised participants (i.e., demand-users, supplyusers, or the traditional power plant) and the y-axis denotes the injection patterns (i.e., injecting larger or smaller related paraments). As we can see, there are six types of ex-ante data integrity attacks by permutation and combination. Given the objective of adversaries to disrupt the real-time pricing scheme, Type 1, Type 4 and Type 6 will not be good options. Thus, we only focus on Type 2, Type 3 and Type 5 here. In the following, we systematically investigate attack scenarios corresponding to Type 2 and Type 3 (i.e., compromising demand-users and supply-users) and understand the malicious impacts of these attacks on the performance of real-time pricing. The impact of Type 5 can be derived by using the similar analysis process as Type 3.
Injecting False Data into Demand-Users
After compromising smart meters deployed in demandusers, the adversary can manipulate preference factors for renewable energy consumption and traditional power consumption. Here, we analyze the impact of manipulating the preference factor for renewable energy consumption to a smaller value. The impact on compromised demand-users: Assume the compromised preference factor to renewable energy resources on demand-user k is w Ã k1 ¼ w k1 À Dw k1 . According to Equations (15) and (26), we can obtain the consumption of renewable energy on compromised demand-users and the price for renewable energy resources, denoted as f d gk Ã and 1 Ã . Thus, based on Equation (3), we can derive the welfare impact of the compromised demand-users as
. In addition, we have
(29) where
The first-order derivative of f 1 ðw k1 Þ can be represented as
we know that f 1 ðw k1 Þ is an increasing function for w k1 . We
is not less than e and lnð XX e Þ ! 0. In addition, the larger the value of Dw k1 is, the larger the absolute value of DW k is.
The impact on normal demand-users: From Equations (15) and (26), we obtain the renewable energy consumption for normal demand-users and the renewable energy price, respectively, which are f
Hence, according to Equation (3), we derive the welfare impact of the normal demand-users as 
Particularly, if
The impact on supply-users. Based on Equations (18) and (26), we can obtain the renewable energy supply for supplyusers and the renewable energy price, denoted as
According to Equation (6), we derive the welfare impact of supply-users as
The larger the value of Dw k1 is, the larger the absolute value of DW k is.
From above analysis, we know that the welfare impact of normal demand-users is positive and the welfare impact of compromised demand-users and supply-users is negative. Thus, we have the following proposition: Proposition 1. If the adversary is among the normal demandusers, he or she can obtain welfare gain and damage the welfare of other participants by launching data integrity attacks and manipulating the preference factor for renewable energy consumption to a smaller value.
Injecting False Data into Supply-Users
After compromising the smart meters located at supplyusers, the adversary can manipulate the value of the coefficient of the cost function. Here, we consider a scenario where the adversary forges a larger value of the coefficient of the cost function for the renewable energy supply.
The impact on demand-users. We assume that the coefficient of the cost function for the renewable energy generated from supply-user k after a data integrity attack is (15) and (26), we obtain the consumption of renewable energy for demand-users and the renewable energy price, which are f
Thus, we derive the individual welfare impact for demand-users according to Equation (3) as
The larger the value of Db k is, the larger the absolute value of DW k is.
The impact on compromised supply-users. From Equations (18) and (26), we obtain the renewable energy supply for compromised supply-users and the renewable energy price, which are f p gk Ã and 1
Thus, we can derive the individual welfare impact of the compromised supply-users according to Equation (6) as
In addition, we have
Because the firstorder derivative of f 2 ðb k Þ can be expressed as
we know that f 2 ðb k Þ is a decreasing function for b k and we can obtain that DW k 0. Particularly, if Db k ¼ 0, we have DW k ¼ 0. Also, the larger the value of Db k is, the larger the absolute value of DW k is. The Impact on Normal Supply-users. Based on Equations (18) and (26), we obtain the renewable energy supply for normal supply-users and the renewable energy price, which are f p gk
Thus, we can derive the welfare impact for normal supply-users according to Equation (6) as
Particularly, if Db k ¼ 0, we have Dp gk ¼ 0; DW k ¼ 0. The larger the value of Db k is, the larger the value of DW k is. From above analysis, we know that the welfare impact of normal supply-users is positive and the welfare impact of compromised supply-users and demand-users is negative. Thus, we have the following proposition: Proposition 2. If the adversary is among the normal supplyusers, he or she can obtain welfare gain and damage the welfare of other participants by launching data integrity attacks and forging a larger value of the coefficient of the cost function for the renewable energy supply.
Ex-Post Attacks
Definition 2. Ex-post attack is launched by the adversary after the decision-making process. In this case, the adversary can compromise obtained correct decisions and manipulate correct decisions erroneously to either larger or smaller values.
We outline a framework for exploring the ex-post data integrity attack space in Fig. 3 . The x-axis represents the compromised participants (i.e., demand-users and supply-users, or demand-users and the traditional power plant) and the y-axis denotes the injection patterns (i.e., injecting larger or smaller related paraments). As we can see from the figure, there are four types of ex-post data integrity attacks. Given the objective of adversaries to disrupt the real-time pricing, Type 7, Type 8, Type 9 and Type 10 are all good options. In the following, we systematically study attack scenarios corresponding to Type 7, Type 8, Type 9 and Type 10 (i.e., compromising demand-users and supply-users, or demand-users and the traditional power plant) and understand the malicious impacts of these attacks on the performance of real-time pricing.
Injecting False Data into Demand-Users and Supply-Users
After compromising smart meters deployed in demand-users and supply-users, the adversary can manipulate the renewable energy consumption decision in the demand-user side and the renewable energy supply decision in supply-user side. Here, we consider two scenarios: (i) manipulating decisions for renewable energy to larger values, and (ii) manipulating decisions for renewable energy to smaller values.
(a) Manipulating the decisions for renewable energy to larger values
The impact on compromised demand-users. Assume the renewable energy consumption decision of demand-user k when the data integrity attack exists is
Then, we can derive the welfare impact of compromised demand-users from Equation (3) in Section 3.1.1, which is
Substituting f d gk in Equation (15) into Equation (40), we obtain DW k ¼ w k1 ln 
Particularly, if Dd gk ¼ 0, we have DW k ¼ 0. In addition, the larger the value of Dd gk is, the larger the absolute value of DW k is.
The Impact on Compromised Supply-users. Assume the renewable energy supply decision of supply-user k when the data integrity attack exists is f p gk Ã ¼ f p gk þ Dp gk . We can derive the welfare impact of compromised supply-users from Equation (6) in Section 3.1.2, which is
Particularly, if Dp gk ¼ 0, then DW k ¼ 0. Also, the larger the value of Dp gk is, the larger the absolute value of DW k is.
From the above analysis, we know that the welfare impact of compromised demand-users and supply-users is negative and we have the following proposition: Proposition 3. The compromised demand-users and supply-users will suffer a welfare loss if the adversary launches data integrity attacks and manipulates decisions for renewable energy to larger values.
(b) Manipulating the decisions for renewable energy to smaller values
The impact on compromised demand-users. Similar to the scenario in Section 4.2.1, assuming the renewable energy consumption decision of demand-user k when the data integrity
we derive the welfare impact of compromised demand-users from Equation (3), which is DW k 0. In addition, the larger the value of Dd gk is, the larger the absolute value of DW k is.
The Impact on Compromised Supply-users. In the same way as the analysis of the scenario in Section 4.2.1, assuming the renewable energy supply decision of supply-user k when the data integrity attack exists is f p gk Ã ¼ f p gk À Dp gk . We can derive the welfare impact of compromised supply-users from Equation (6) in Section 3.1.2, which is DW k 0. Also, the larger the value of Dp gk is, the larger the absolute value of DW k is.
From above analysis, we know that the welfare impact of compromised demand-users and supply-users is negative and we have the following proposition: Proposition 4. The compromised demand-users and supply-users will suffer a welfare loss if the adversary launches data integrity attacks and manipulates decisions for renewable energy to smaller values. 
Injecting False Data into Demand-Users and the Traditional Power Plant
After compromising smart meters located at demand-users and the traditional power plant, the adversary can manipulate the traditional power consumption decision in the demand-user side and the traditional power supply decision in the traditional power plant side. Here, we consider two scenarios: (i) manipulating the decisions for traditional power to larger values, and (ii) manipulating the decisions for traditional power to smaller values.
(a) Manipulating the decisions for traditional power to larger values
The impact on compromised demand-users. Assume the traditional power consumption decision of demand-user k when the data integrity attack exists is f d tk Ã ¼ f d tk þ Dd tk . We can derive the welfare impact of compromised demandusers from Equation (3) in Section 3.1.1, which is
Particularly, if Dd tk ¼ 0, we have DW k ¼ 0. In addition, the larger the value of Dd tk is, the larger the absolute value of DW k is. The deduction process is similar to the deduction process in Section 4.2.1.
The impact on the traditional power plant. Assume the traditional power supply decision of the traditional power plant when the data integrity attack exists is e p t Ã ¼ e p t þ Dp t . We derive the welfare impact of the compromised traditional power plant from Equation (9) in Section 3.1.3, which is
Particularly, if Dp t ¼ 0, then DW ¼ 0. Also, the larger the value of Dp t is, the larger the absolute value of DW is.
From the above analysis, we know that the welfare impact of compromised demand-users and the traditional power plant is negative and we have the following proposition:
Proposition 5. The compromised demand-users and the traditional power plant will suffer a welfare loss if the adversary launches data integrity attacks and manipulates the decisions for traditional power to larger values.
(b) Manipulating the decisions for traditional power to smaller values
The impact on compromised demand-users: Similar to the scenario in Section 4.2.2, assuming the traditional power consumption decision of demand-user k when the data integrity attack exists is f
We can derive the welfare impact of compromised demand-users from Equation (3), which is DW k 0. In addition, the larger the value of Dd tk is, the larger the absolute value of DW k is.
The impact on the traditional power plant: In the same way as the analysis of the scenario in Section 4.2.2, assuming the traditional power supply decision of the traditional power plant when the data integrity attack exists is e p t Ã ¼ e p t À Dp t . We can also derive the welfare impact of the compromised traditional power plant from Equation (9) in Section 3.1.3, which is DW 0: In addition, the larger the value of Dp t is, the larger the absolute value of DW is.
From above analysis, we know that the welfare impact of compromised demand-users and the traditional power plant is negative. Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 6. The compromised demand-users and the traditional power plant will suffer a welfare loss if the adversary launches data integrity attacks and manipulates the decisions for traditional power to smaller values.
Notice that the compromised amount of renewable energy consumption in demand-user side should not be more than the compromised amount of renewable energy supply in supply-user side. Also, the compromised amount of traditional power consumption in the demand-user side should not be more than the compromised amount of traditional power supply in the traditional power plant. Because supply and demand imbalance could cause users to suffer power outages that can allow an adversary to be identified. In addition, we can integrate attacks in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 to disrupt the real-time pricing scheme, the damage of these integrated attack can be derived from the integration of above analysis.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In our evaluation setup, we consider a scenario with 15 demand-users (i.e., N ¼ 15), 20 supply-users (i.e., M ¼ 20), and a traditional power plant. In addition to c j ¼ 0, Table 2 shows the coefficients of the cost function of renewable energy resources (i.e., a j ; b j ) generated by supply-users, which are the same in all time durations. The magnitude of these coefficients is 10 À2 and they are selected according to [13] . The coefficients of the cost function of traditional power resources of the traditional power plant are m ¼ 0:05; n ¼ 0:05; q ¼ 0. These coefficients are selected according to the marginal cost ratio of solar energy and bulk energy in [36] . We also suppose that: (i) the renewable energy resource is solar energy, a typical renewable energy resource, and (ii) we investigate only the real-time pricing scheme from 8:00 to 18:00 during daytime. As an example, we divide this time duration (i.e., [8 18] ) into five time durations: t 1 ¼ ½8 10; t 2 ¼ ½10 12; t 3 ¼ ½12 14; t 4 ¼ ½14 16; t 5 ¼ ½16 18 and order these durations as t 3 ; t 4 ; t 2 ; t 1 ; t 5 according to sunlight intensity (i.e., preference factors to renewable energy resources). This means that preference factors to renewable energy resources are the largest and preference factors to the traditional power resources are the smallest in the time duration t 3 , and that preference factors to renewable energy resources are the smallest and preference factors to traditional power resources are the largest in the time duration t 5 .
To make prices reasonable (i.e., the price of renewable energy is in the range [0 2] $=kWh from practice), we set the preference factors to renewable energy resources and traditional power resources in the time duration t 3 as shown in Table 2 . For other time durations, the preference factors to the renewable energy resources are declined by 2 and the preference factors to traditional power resources are increased by 2, following the order t 3 ; t 4 ; t 2 ; t 1 ; t 5 .
Notice that DID and SID denote the identifiers of the demand-users and the supply-users. To verify the effectiveness and feasibility of our real-time pricing scheme, we conduct a performance evaluation to compare with existing average cost schemes, in which electricity price is computed by dividing the total generation cost by the total amount of generated energy [61] , [62] .
To measure the impact of the two types of data integrity attacks on the real-time pricing process, we consider two metrics: welfare loss and welfare gain, defined in Section 4. Fig. 4 depicts the amount of renewable energy consumption and the traditional power consumption in different time durations. As we can see, with the increase in the sunlight intensity (i.e., the increase in the preference factors to renewable energy resources), the use of renewable energy resources increases. Also, with the decrease in the sunlight intensity (i.e., the increase in the preference factors to traditional power resources), the use of traditional power resources grows. This verifies that the real-time pricing scheme can efficiently guide end-users and traditional power plants to consume or provide energy according to real-time status. Fig. 5 depicts the prices for renewable energy resources in different time durations when our approach and the average cost schemes are used. As we can see, with the increase in the preference factors to renewable energy resources, the price for renewable energy resources increases. The largest values for our method and the average cost schemes are $1.23/kWh and $0.64/kWh in the time duration t 3 . Also, the price for renewable energy resources by using our approach is larger than the amount when the average cost scheme is used. Fig. 6 depicts the prices for traditional power in different time durations by using our approach and the average cost schemes. As we can see, with the increase in the preference factor to traditional power resources, the price for traditional power resources increases. Also, the price for traditional power resources by using our approach is larger than the one when the average cost scheme is used. Fig. 7 depicts the welfare of demand-users and supplyusers in the time duration t 3 when our approach and the average cost scheme are used. As we can see in Fig. 7a , with the increase in the preference factors to renewable energy resources and the decrease in the preference factors to traditional power resources, the welfare of demand-users increases. The largest values for our method and the average cost scheme are $68:76 and $93:23 in the time duration t 3 . Also, the welfare of demand-users for the average cost scheme is larger than the amount when our approach is used. As we can see in Fig. 7b , with the increase in the generation cost of renewable energy resources, the welfare of supply-users declines and the welfare of supply-user 7 to supply-user 20 becomes negative for the average cost scheme. The reason is that the generation cost for these users is larger than the average generation cost. Also, because the trade price of traditional power is equal to its generation cost, the welfare of the traditional power plant is zero. These results are unacceptable to these supply-users and the traditional power plant. In contrast, our real-time pricing is efficient and acceptable to all participants.
Efficiency of the Real-Time Pricing Scheme
Impacts of Ex-Ante Attacks
Injecting False Data into Demand-Users
Fig . 8 shows the impact of the number of compromised demand-users on the decreased welfare of the compromised demand-users. As we can see, with the increase in the number of the compromised demand-users, the decreased welfare of the compromised demand-users increases almost linearly. Fig. 9 shows the impact of the number of compromised demand-users on the increased welfare of normal demand-users. As we can see, with the increase in the number of the compromised demandusers, the increased welfare of the normal demand-users increases smoothly. Fig. 10 shows the impact of the number of compromised demand-users on the decreased welfare of supply-users. We can see that, with the increase in the number of the compromised demand-users, the decreased welfare of the supply-users increases almost linearly. The result is consistent with the analytical result in Section 4.1.1. This means that if the adversary is among the normal demand-users, he or she can obtain welfare gain and damage the welfare of other participants in this case.
Injecting False Data into Supply-Users
Fig . 11 shows the impact of the number of compromised supply-users on the decreased welfare of demand-users.
As we can see, with the increase in the number of the compromised supply-users, the decreased welfare of the demand-users increases almost linearly. Fig. 12 shows the impact of the number of compromised supply-users on the decreased welfare of the compromised supplyusers. We can see that, with the increase in the number of the compromised supply-users, the decreased welfare of the compromised supply-users increases almost linearly. Fig. 13 shows the impact of the number of compromised supply-users on the increased welfare of normal supply-users. We can see that, with the increase in the number of the compromised supply-users, the increased welfare of the normal supply-users increases almost linearly. The result is consistent with the analytical result in Section 4.1.2. This means that if the adversary is among the normal supply-users, he or she can obtain welfare gain and damage the welfare of other participants in this case.
Impacts of Ex-Post Attacks
Injecting False Data into Demand-Users and Supply-Users
Recall in Section 4, we consider two scenarios: (i) manipulating the decisions for renewable energy to larger values, and (ii) manipulating the decisions for renewable energy to smaller values. The detailed evaluation results are given below: (a) Manipulating the decisions for renewable energy to larger values Fig. 14 illustrates the impact of the number of compromised demand-users and supply-users on the decreased welfare of the compromised demand-users. As we can see, with the increase in the number of the compromised demand-users and supply-users, the decreased welfare of the compromised demand-users increases almost linearly. Fig. 15 illustrates the impact of the number of compromised demand-users and supply-users on the decreased welfare of the compromised supply-users. We observe that, with the increase in the number of the compromised demandusers and supply-users, the decreased welfare of the compromised supply-users increases almost linearly. The result is consistent with the analytical result in Section 4.2.1. This means if the adversary launches data integrity attacks in this case, the compromised demand-users and supply-users will suffer a welfare loss.
(b) Manipulating the decisions for renewable energy to smaller values Fig. 16 illustrates the impact of the number of compromised demand-users and supply-users on the decreased welfare of the compromised demand-users. We can see that, with the increase in the number of the compromised demand-users and supply-users, the decreased welfare of the compromised demand-users increases almost linearly. Fig. 17 illustrates the impact of the number of compromised demand-users and supplyusers on the decreased welfare of the compromised supply-users. As we can see, with the increase in the number of the compromised demand-users and supply-users, the decreased welfare of the compromised supply-users increases almost linearly. The result is consistent with the analytical result in Section 4.2.1. This means if the adversary launches data integrity attacks in this case, the compromised demand-users and supply-users will suffer a welfare loss. Also, if the manipulated quantity of renewable energy data in Section 4.2.1 is the same, the decreased welfare of compromised supply-users is the same.
Injecting False Data into Demand-Users and the Traditional Power Plant
As mentioned in Section 4, we consider two scenarios: (i) manipulating the decisions for traditional power to larger values, and (ii) manipulating the decisions for traditional power to smaller values. The detailed evaluation results are given below: (a) Manipulating the decisions for traditional power to larger values Fig. 18 illustrates the impact of the number of compromised demand-users on the decreased welfare of the compromised demand-users. We can see that, with the increase in the number of the compromised demand-users, the decreased welfare of the compromised demand-users increases almost linearly. Fig. 19 illustrates the impact of the number of compromised demand-users on the decreased welfare of the compromised traditional power plant. From the figure, with the increase in the number of the compromised demand-users, the decreased welfare of the compromised traditional power plant increases smoothly. The result is consistent with the analytical result in Section 4.2.2. This means if the adversary launches data integrity attacks in this case, the compromised demand-users and the traditional power plant will suffer a welfare loss.
(b) Manipulating the decisions for traditional power to smaller values Fig. 20 illustrates the impact of the number of compromised demand-users on the decreased welfare of the compromised demand-users. As we can see, with the increase in the number of the compromised demand-users, the decreased welfare of the compromised demand-users increases almost linearly. Fig. 21 illustrates the impact of the number of compromised demand-users on the decreased welfare of the compromised traditional power plant. As we can see, with the increase in the number of the compromised demand-users, the decreased welfare of the compromised traditional power plant increases smoothly. The result is consistent with the analytical result in Section 4.2.2. This means if the adversary launches data integrity attacks in this case, the compromised demand-users and traditional power plant will suffer a welfare loss. Also, if the manipulated quantity of traditional power data in Section 4.2.2 is the same, the decreased welfare of compromised traditional power plant is the same.
DISCUSSION
We now discuss several extension: models for optimal pricing, attack scenarios, and countermeasures.
Extended models for optimal pricing. In this paper, we take solar energy as an example for renewable energy resources. As an extension, other renewable energy resources (e.g., wind, biomass, hydro, and geothermal resources) shall be considered by leveraging different generation cost functions. To this end, with the Lagrangian-based approach and analytical process in Sections 3 and 4, we can obtain optimal decisions and investigate the impacts of data integrity attacks on the real-time pricing scheme when other renewable energy resources are integrated. Also, the optimal values of energy consumption, power supply (i.e., d ). From Equations (15) , (18) , and (21), we can obtain that when the optimal values are larger than the maximum values, the decision values will be equal to the maximum values. Nonetheless, attacks in this scenario may not be good options for the adversary. The reason is that the decisions values made in the attacked case and in the normal case are equal to the maximum values, which has no impact (or damage) on welfare of end-users and the traditional power plant. Thus, in this paper, we only focused on the scenarios where optimal values in the normal case and in the attacked case are not larger than the maximum values.
Extended attack scenarios. In this paper, when we consider ex-ante attacks launched by the adversary before the decision-making process, we analyze the impacts of manipulated parameters w k1 and b k on our real-time pricing scheme. As an extension, we shall analyze the impacts of other forged parameters. For example, the forged parameters a k and m will cause a welfare loss of demand-users, supply-users and the traditional power plant. Furthermore, the developed analytical framework and metrics can be extended to investigate the impact of data integrity attacks on other real-time pricing schemes, which rely on measurements from smart meters to make the decision for determining electricity price to maximize the welfare of all participants.
Countermeasures. To defend against the investigated data integrity attacks, we shall study effective and efficient detection schemes. For example, behavior-based detection schemes can be leveraged to detect malicious energy devices (i.e., smart meters, sensors). Machine learning techniques (Support Vector Machine (SVM), Naive Bayes, etc.) can be used to capture and examine the runtime behaviors of devices in the energy-based cyber-physical system. We can also develop anomaly-based detection schemes (statistical analysis, hypothesis test, etc.) to detect manipulated energy related data (e.g., distributed power supply, traditional bulk power generation, energy demand).
RELATED WORK
As we stated in Section 1, the existing research on real-time pricing could be divided into four main categories [7] , [8] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] . The first category is concerned with reducing the peak-to-average load ratio through encouraging users to shift their usage to off-peak hours, and matching supply with demand (e.g., [7] , [14] , [16] , [18] , [19] ). For example, Ma et al. [14] proposed a real-time pricing-based energy control scheme to deal with the peak load of the energybased cyber-physical system. The second is concerned with achieving the minimum economic cost (e.g., [8] , [15] , [17] , [20] , [21] ). For example, Zhou et al. [21] focused on reducing the users' energy cost by studying how to fully utilize the water tank and the battery pack for combined heat and power systems. The third category is concerned with maximizing the welfare of all participants, and considers both economic cost and users' comfort of using energy (e.g., [13] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] ). For example, Mohsenian-Rad et al. [13] developed a real-time pricing scheme, in which multiple consumers shared a common traditional power resource. The fourth is concerned with improving the cost efficiency that is defined as the ratio of consumer's total consumption benefit to total electricity payment within a time duration (e.g., [26] , [27] ). For example, Ma et al. [27] proposed a costefficient real-time pricing mechanism by using a fractional programming approach. Notice that existing research efforts on the third category typically considered a single type of energy resource (i.e., renewable energy resources or traditional power resources).
There have been a number of research efforts on data integrity attacks in the energy-based cyber-physical systems and countermeasures [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] , [35] , [36] , [37] , [38] , [39] , [40] , [41] , [42] , [43] , [44] , [45] , [46] , [47] , [48] , [49] , [50] , [51] , [52] . Particularly, a number of research efforts have been further devoted on the investigation of data integrity attacks against state estimation [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] , [32] , [33] . Because the market domain in the smart grid operates and coordinates all participants in electricity markets and involves economic profit, data integrity attacks against electricity markets have attracted considerable interest as well. For example, the vulnerabilities of real-time LMP were investigated [34] , [35] , [37] , [38] , [39] , [40] , [41] . In our previous work, we investigated data integrity attacks against the multistep electricity price model [36] , [49] . For the realtime pricing, Mohsenian-Rad et al. [42] conceptually investigated that an adversary could compromise the communication process, smart meters, or data centers to manipulate a variety of practical loads and the price signal via Internetbased load-altering attacks. Research efforts on [43] , [44] , [48] , [51] demonstrated that the adversary could damage the stability of power grid by launching dynamic load-altering attacks or load-redistribution attacks. Also, research efforts [45] , [46] , [47] , [48] , [52] investigated the impact of data integrity attacks on the stability of power grid, in which the adversary could inject false real-time price signals transmitted through communication networks.
Unlike existing schemes, in this paper we investigate a real-time pricing scheme, which considers both distributed renewable energy resources and traditional power supply in the energy-based cyber-physical system, to maximize the benefit (or welfare) of all participants, and which is concurrently suitable for the energy-based cyber-physical system involving multiple energy resources. We then systematically studied and formalized the welfare impacts of two types of data integrity attacks against real-time pricing schemes, in order to understand the risks of these attacks, and effectively design mitigation schemes to combat these vulnerabilities.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated a real-time pricing scheme that can guide all individual participants of the energybased cyber-physical system to achieve maximal welfare. Specifically, we first developed a Lagrangian-based approach to transform the global optimization conducted by the power company to distributed optimization problems to obtain explicit energy consumption, supply, and price decisions for individual participants. We showed that these distributed problems derived from the global optimization by the power company are consistent with individual welfare maximization problems of end-users and the traditional power plant. We then investigated two types of data integrity attacks against the real-time pricing scheme: Exante attacks and Ex-post attacks. We also quantitatively analyzed the impact of these attacks on welfare of demandusers, supply-users, and the traditional power plant, respectively. Our theoretical analysis and simulation data show that our developed real-time pricing scheme can effectively guide the participants to achieve welfare maximization and our investigated attacks can significantly disrupt the realtime pricing scheme, posing welfare reduction for both endusers and traditional power plant. " For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
